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GOOD FENCES MAKE GOOD (SPACE) NEIGHBOURS 
DALE STEPHENS AND LACHLAN BLAKE 
Humanity has reached a critical point in its history.  Technological advancements herald a 
great renaissance for humanity’s reach to the stars.  States and private companies plan 
commercial and other activities in space and upon celestial bodies, demonstrating that 
humankind can become an inter-planetary species. Such planning occurs in accordance 
with the prevailing space law regime and, notwithstanding the undeniable ambition of the 
planners, it is evident this space law regime does have gaps and ambiguities that must be 
addressed before these endeavours can be meaningfully fulfilled. This article examines the 
legal regime encapsulated by the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (‘OST’) (ratified by all major 
space-faring nations) and explores ways in which specific OST provisions can give rise to 
temporary proprietary and jurisdictional rights, which can be used to avoid future conflict 
in space. The authors contend that these provisions provide rights of control to States so as 
to manage ‘facilities’, to exercise jurisdiction and to observe rights of ‘due regard’ that in 
turn establish basic legal boundaries.  Such boundaries, it is argued, permit confidence and 
certainty in the conduct of commercial and other activities upon celestial bodies, enabling 
competing States and companies to delimit areas in which they conduct their operations. 
Additionally, the article examines the capacity of military forces to operate on these celestial 
bodies so as to undertake a peacekeeping type role consistently with the provisions of the 
OST.  Such a function is argued to be necessary, given the unique attribution mechanism of 
the OST that can give public legal significance to the acts of private companies. It is an 
underlying theme of this article that respecting legal boundaries on the Moon and other 
celestial bodies while engaging in commercial activity can create good neighbours which in 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The 1960s saw intense competition between the two major space powers, namely the 
United States (‘US’) and the former Soviet Union (‘USSR.’), in their struggle to be 
triumphant in the space race. Despite the strong rivalry, both the US and USSR. were able 
to negotiate a key multilateral treaty that sets out the fundamental legal principles that 
would guide humanity’s reach for the stars. The resulting effort, the 1967 Outer Space 
Treaty (‘OST’),1 establishes the basic framework for the conduct of all space activity and 
enjoys a high number of subsequent State party ratifications, including all of the major 
space powers today.2 The OST provides, inter alia, that there shall be no national 
appropriation of space or any celestial body.3 It also proscribes the establishment of 
military bases, and other particular military activities, on the Moon and other celestial 
bodies.4 Such a framework is commendable in seeking to avoid the egregious mistakes 
that came from the colonialisation projects of European powers in former centuries, and 
is specifically committed to the goal of ensuring the cooperative and peaceful exploration 
and use of outer space.5     
While setting out the fundamental principles for guiding space activities, the OST was 
very much a product of its time. Drafted when only a limited number of States had the 
 
1 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including 
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature 27 January 1967, 610 UNTS 205 (entered into 
force 10 October 1967) (‘OST’).  
2 In particular, ratifications made by the US (10 October 1967), the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (10 
October 1967), China (12 January 1984) (by accession) and India (18 January 1982).      
3 OST (n 1) art II. 
4 Ibid art IV. 
5 Ibid Preamble, art I. 






economic, technological and industrial capacity to voyage into space and the goals for 
human habitation of celestial bodies were very uncertain, the basic framework 
adequately reflected the realities of 1967. However, in the current century, it is self-
evident that many more States, as well as private companies, now have the same 
capacities to explore and use space. Moreover, it is also becoming very clear that human 
settlement and exploitation of resources within space are on the cusp of being fully 
realised. Such exploitation of space resources is envisioned to allow humanity to travel 
further into the solar system and become an interplanetary species.6 Given these 
imminent developments, it may be fairly asked whether the OST is optimally suited to 
meet the emerging challenges that have already manifested as States and private entities 
start and increase their activities in space. A case is made in this article that the OST 
framework is not ideally suited to meet current, and inevitably increasing, pressures in 
this area. However, it will be argued that the OST does contain provisions that provide a 
reasonable starting point. While it is laudable that States cannot claim space and celestial 
bodies as national territory, the absence of any kind of proprietary entitlement to 
undertake activities on the Moon or other celestial bodies, however temporary, sows the 
seeds for uncertainty and potential conflict. Similarly, it is desirable that the blanket 
prohibition on military bases and other stated military activities on the Moon and other 
celestial bodies serves the goal of lessening military competition and conflict. However, 
security concerns remain, especially under the unique attribution framework established 
by the OST. Article VI of that treaty links the actions of private actors in space much more 
directly with the State than what general international law rules otherwise provide for 
attribution. Such direct attribution for private actors in space thus allows for the 
possibility of unwitting violation of international law in circumstances where States 
would not otherwise be implicated. Such violation has the real chance of heightening 
 
6 Dylan Love, ‘The Next Frontier: Space Miners are the Universe’s Future Tycoons’, CNBC (Web Page, 26 
December 2016) <https://www.cnbc.com/2016/12/26/the-next-frontier-space-miners-are-the-
universes-future-tycoons.html>; Adrian Turner, ‘Mars and Our Path to Being an Interplanetary Species’, 
Financial Review (Web Page, 18 July 2019) <https://www.afr.com/work-and-careers/leaders/mars-and-
our-path-to-being-an-interplanetary-species-20190718-p528ky>; Rob Liddell, ‘Could We Become an 









tensions and risking conflict. Accordingly, security mechanisms that maintain control 
over such private actors and otherwise ‘keep the peace’ are necessary.    
Given that humanity is about to enter a new era of space use, and the likelihood of any 
major new multilateral treaty is unlikely, this article will examine how the existing 
provisions of the OST may be interpreted and applied to achieve humanity’s current goals 
while minimising the risk of potential conflict. A case will be made that there is some 
capacity to use pre-existing, though as yet untested, provisions of the OST. It will be 
argued that these may provide for both a sense of relative confidence in undertaking 
commercial activities in space as well as allowing for a sense of security and ensuring de-
escalation of conflict in undertaking those very same activities. The article will comprise 
three parts: first, a brief survey of currently planned activities in space will be undertaken 
to provide context; then, an analysis of Articles VIII and XII of the OST will be undertaken 
to assess whether they can provide a basis for ensuring confidence in undertaking 
planned activity; finally, an assessment of Article IV and the prohibition on a number of 
military activities will be undertaken. Paradoxically, a case will be made that the 
restrictions outlined in Article IV need to be read narrowly in order to ensure that 
military forces can be deployed on ‘peacekeeping’ type missions to exercise control over 
private actors and broker disagreements in a manner that reduces the risk of escalating 
tension and potential conflict. 
II CONTEXT OF CURRENT AND NEAR FUTURE SPACE ACTIVITIES 
The new space race for the 21st century has already begun. Unlike its 1960s counterpart, 
the field today is comprised of numerous States, as well as many capable private actors. 
New technology has quite literally propelled the world into an era in which commercial 
uses of space are driving an economic paradigm shift. Mining on celestial bodies is an 
inevitability and traditional ways of thinking about international space law must shift 
accordingly. In April 2020, the Trump administration signed an executive order 
encouraging an American return to the Moon,7 led by the US’ commercial companies and 
precipitating an exponential increase in exploration and exploitation of mineral and 
 
7 United States Government Executive Order No 13914, ‘Encouraging International Support for the 
Recovery and Use of Space Resources’, Federal Register, vol 85, no 70 
<https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-04-10/pdf/2020-07800.pdf>. 






chemical resources from the Moon, Mars, and other celestial bodies. The order 
complements the Obama administration’s US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness 
Act 2015 (‘Commercial Space Act’)8 through which the U.S. Government provided its 
citizens the right to claim commercial ownership of celestial resources and established 
the theme of a commercially led race to claim space resources. US Government officials 
have sought interest from China and other space faring States to engage in cooperative 
commercial operations in space.9 The significance of these declarations in light of the 
value and the scale of commercial space industry will be demonstrated further in this 
paper. Other States are also planning their own commercial space initiatives: China has 
already announced its own long-term plans for the extraction of space resources, with 
the current chief scientist of the Chinese Lunar Exploration Program remarking on the 
feasibility of removing large quantities of Helium-3 from the Moon as long ago as 2006;10 
Russia and Europe are collaboratively assessing resource deposits on the Moon through 
the aptly named Prospect project.11  
Private actors are equally important drivers of this paradigm shift. The so-called 
‘billionaire space race’12 lists Jeff Bezos’ Blue Origin, Elon Musk’s SpaceX and Richard 
Branson’s Virgin Galactic as its main competitors. These companies are some of the 
most well-known of thousands of companies interested in the commercial exploitation 
of space. These private actors are engaged for good reason. Predictions of the potential 
profits of space mining ventures are, in a word, astronomical. Goldman Sachs’ 
conservative estimate of the value of minerals extracted from a single small asteroid at 
between US $25-50 billion is indeed difficult for a more terrestrially minded audience 
 
8 US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, HR Res 2262, 114th Congress (2015). See Executive 
Order No. 13914 (n 8) for an explicit reference to the U.S Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act.  
9 Theresa Hitchens, ‘WH Woos Potential Allies, Including China for Space Mining’, Breaking Defense (Web 
Page, 6 April 2020) <https://breakingdefense.com/2020/04/wh-woos-potential-allies-including-china-
for-space-mining/>. 
10 Jia Hepeng, ‘He Asked for The Moon and He Got It’, China Daily (Web Page, 26 July 2006) 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2006-07/26/content_649325.htm>; Jack H Burke, ‘China’s New 
Wealth-Creation Scheme: Mining the Moon’, National Review (Web Page, 13 June 2019) 
<https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/06/china-moon-mining-ambitious-space-plans/>. 
11 European Space Agency, ‘One Step Closer to Prospecting the Moon’, Science & Exploration (Web Page, 
30 January 2020) 
<https://www.esa.int/Science_Exploration/Human_and_Robotic_Exploration/Exploration/One_step_clos
er_to_prospecting_the_Moon>. 
12 David Dawkins, ‘Billionaire Space Race: Elon Musk Shows Sympathy as Branson’s Virgin Orbit Fails to 
Lift Off’, Forbes (Web Page, 26 May 2020). 





to comprehend.13 Companies like Deep Space Industries and Planetary Resources have 
already aimed to extract celestial resources, and their goals contributed to the creation 
of the US Commercial Space Act mentioned above.14 The failure of these two companies 
in 2018 shows that the industry is volatile.15 As will be demonstrated in this article, the 
law surrounding such operations poses a number of challenges for commercial 
operations which must be addressed. Nonetheless, the creativity of these commercial 
actors is boundless, and they are accomplishing significant technological feats. Blue 
Origin recently revealed its lunar lander and announced its plan to harvest water 
resources from the Moon to convert into hydrogen-based fuel.16 Blue Origin, Dynetics 
and SpaceX have realised significant advancements in lunar landing technology and 
each received major contracts from NASA to help land humans on the Moon as early as 
2024.17 SpaceX and NASA also recently collaborated in a historic launch of a crewed 
mission to the International Space Station (ISS) this year, the first such mission from 
American soil in nearly a decade.18 Outside the US, nearly 150 Chinese companies have 
entered the commercial space arena. One of these companies, Origin Space, has 
developed a method of telescopic prospecting, allowing China to map celestial 
resources through a satellite in Low Earth Orbit.19 Interestingly, one of the billionaire 
participants in the new space race, Elon Musk, explicitly espouses an intention to apply 
this technology to the eventual human settlement of Mars, musing on the possibility of 
humankind becoming an interplanetary species by 2050.20 
 
13 Jack Heise, ‘Space, the Final Frontier of Enterprise: Incentivizing Asteroid Mining Under a Revised 
International Framework’ (2018) 40(1) Michigan Journal of International Law 191. 
14 Jeff Foust, ‘Lunar Exploration Providing New Impetus for Space Resources Legal Debate’, SpaceNews 
(Web Page, 7 September 2019) <https://spacenews.com/lunar-exploration-providing-new-impetus-for-
space-resources-legal-debate/>. 
15 See Atossa Araxia Abrahamian, ‘How the Asteroid-Mining Bubble Burst’, MIT Technology Review (Web 
Page, 26 June 2019) <https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/06/26/134510/asteroid-mining-
bubble-burst-history/>. 
16 Jeff Foust, ‘Blue Origin Unveils Lunar Lander’, SpaceNews (Web Page, 9 May 2019) 
<https://spacenews.com/blue-origin-unveils-lunar-lander/>. 
17 Michael Sheetz, ‘NASA Awards Contracts to Jeff Bezos and Elon Musk to Land Astronauts on the Moon’, 
CNBC (Web Page, 30 April 2020) <https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/30/nasa-selects-hls-lunar-lander-
teams-blue-origin-spacex-dynetics.html>. 
18 Jeff Foust, ‘Crew Dragon in Orbit after Historic Launch’, SpaceNews (Web Page, 30 May 2020) 
<https://spacenews.com/crew-dragon-in-orbit-after-historic-launch/>. 
19 Andrew Jones, ‘Chinese Space Resource Utilization Firm Origin Space Signs Deal for Space Telescope’ , 
SpaceNews (Web Page, 23 April 2020) <https://spacenews.com/chinese-space-resource-utilization-firm-
origin-space-signs-deal-for-space-telescope/>. 
20 Mike Wall, ‘Elon Musk Is Still Thinking Big with SpaceX’s Starship Mars-Colonizing Rocket. Really Big’, 
Space.com (Web Page, 18 January 2020) <https://www.space.com/elon-musk-starship-spacex-flights-
mars-colony.html>. 






Regarding the lawfulness of the mining and use of space resources, the International 
Institute of Space Law (IISL) has concluded that the extraction of such material from 
celestial bodies (for non-State parties to the Moon Agreement) is not expressly prohibited 
under current international space law.21 In its 2015 position paper, the IISL notes the 
express prohibition on national appropriation in the OST, but acknowledges that the US 
legislation does not assert this and the US view of their legal rights regarding use of 
resources may be shared by other States.22 Indeed, this US legislation, alongside that of 
the United Arab Emirates (‘UAE’)23 and Luxembourg,24 is shaping our understanding of 
the legality of mining operations, with each of the three countries taking collaborative 
steps to assert the legality of, and become global leaders in, space resource extraction.25 
This municipal legislation can be taken as state practice and opinio juris, and will usefully 
inform the interpretation of customary international law in this area.26 Moreover, it has 
the capacity to inform the meaning of treaty terms in accordance with Article 31(3)(b) of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.27 As such, while such activities remain 
potentially legally ambiguous at present, there is an ongoing push towards their 
classification as lawful activity.28  
As more State and corporate interests explicitly announce their intentions and prepare 
to commence space operations, debates over the manner in which space resources will 
be exploited become crucial to resolve before the rapidly approaching rush for resources. 
New issues surrounding the prospecting of resources; the building of infrastructure on 
 
21 International Institute of Space Law, ‘Position Paper on Space Resource Mining’ (adopted 20 December 
2015) <http://iislwebo.wwwnlss1.a2hosted.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/SpaceResourceMining.pdf> (para 2: ‘Therefore, in view of the absence of a 
clear prohibition of the taking of resources in the Outer Space Treaty one can conclude that the use of 
space resources is permitted’). 
22 Ibid [2], [3]. 
23 See Government of the United Arab Emirates, ‘The UAE Space Law’, Space Science and Technology 
(Web Page, 20 July 2020) <https://u.ae/en/about-the-uae/science-and-technology/key-sectors-in-
science-and-technology/space-science-and-technology> (‘UAE Space Law’); Federal Law No 12 of 2019 
On the Regulation of the Space Sector (UAE) (2019). 
24 See Le Gouvernement Du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, Luxembourg Space Agency, ‘Law of July 20th 
2017 on the Exploration and Use of Space Resources’ (Web Page, 18 November 2018) <https://space-
agency.public.lu/en/agency/legal-framework/law_space_resources_english_translation.html> (‘Law of 
July 20th’). 
25 See generally Scot W Anderson, Korey Christensen and Julia LaManna, ‘The Development of Natural 
Resources in Outer Space’ (2018) 37(2) Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 227. 
26 See Statute of the International Court of Justice art 38(1)(c). 
27 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered 
into force 27 January 1980) (‘VCLT’). 
28 See John G Wrench, ‘Non-Appropriation, No Problem: The Outer Space Treaty is Ready for Asteroid 
Mining’ (2019) 51(1) Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 437. 





celestial bodies; conflicts over resources; State jurisdiction and control over claimed 
resources, and resource extracting operations; and many, so far unimaginable scenarios 
will manifest in challenging and fascinating ways.  
III THE OUTER SPACE TREATY 
The range, scope and pace of thinking, investment and capability in this burgeoning field 
of space activity is impressive. However, the capacity of the OST to address these 
developments is less certain. The OST’s ban on national appropriation ensures that no 
State can outright claim national territory in space; however, it does not set up any 
accompanying regime to govern temporary rights as to the use of space or celestial 
bodies. For example, it is easy to anticipate a potential conflict where the mining company 
of one country finds resources in a particular location on an asteroid or the Moon, and 
another company from another country moves into this very same area to extract the 
same resources, possibly right on top of the original area claimed by the first company. 
At present, the absence of any proprietary right that can be asserted by either company 
does not prevent such an outcome. Inevitably, such an action will lead to a dispute that 
may escalate into actual conflict. On earth, a State’s national territory, airspace and 
territorial seas, have particular legal status and national military forces monitor and 
provide continuing security over such areas. Moreover, the rights and obligations of 
States and private parties are well understood, and foreign companies and other entities 
are provided with permission (or not) to undertake commercial activities within such 
areas.   
The OST provides only two Articles that deal to a greater or lesser extent with proprietary 
rights. These are Articles VIII and XII. It will be these two Articles that will, initially at 
least, likely provide the foundation for seeking to set jurisdictional and legal boundaries 
and hence certainty for planned activities. Even so, their ambit and scope are unlikely to 
fully provide what is necessary. The following section will address the content and 
potential application of Articles VIII and XII of the OST. It will then assess the nature of 
the military prohibitions contained within Article IV and identify where the implied 
permissions in this Article may, in fact, enhance a sense of security for future planned 
activities. 






A Article VIII 
Article VIII of the OST provides: 
[a] State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer 
space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over 
any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body.  
Registration is normally undertaken pursuant to the terms of the 1975 Registration 
Convention.29 Von der Dunk notes that Article VIII provides jurisdiction ‘on a quasi-
territorial basis’ and ought to be construed as providing States ‘maximum leeway’ as 
regards jurisdiction.30 Accordingly, a State which is the State of registry of a space object 
has exclusive enforcement (the right to investigate, arrest, prosecute or otherwise 
enforce laws), and comprehensive prescriptive (the right to make laws that can apply to 
nationals) and adjudicative (the right to exercise judicial control over the resolution of a 
dispute) jurisdiction with respect to that space object. There can only be one State of 
registry and thus if there are multiple States involved in the one space object, then an 
agreement will be necessary to nominate which State shall be the relevant State of 
registry. 
Importantly, Article VIII does not prohibit other States from seeking to exercise 
prescriptive or adjudicative jurisdiction. It does mean, however, that a State that is not 
the State of registry cannot exercise enforcement jurisdiction within the physical area of 
a space object. While several States may have concurrent prescriptive and adjudicative 
jurisdiction, only the State of registry has the primary right of enforcement jurisdiction 
based upon its exclusive enforcement powers over a space object. This can be assessed 
with reference to state practice under the International Space Station Agreement (‘ISS 
Agreement’).31 The ISS Agreement invokes Article VIII of the OST in setting out principles 
of jurisdiction and ownership, and illustrates how States interpret the limits of 
 
29 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature 6 June 1975, 
1023 UNTS 15 (entered into force 15 September 1976) (‘the Registration Convention’). 
30 Frans G Von Der Dunk, ‘Effective Exercise of “In Space Jurisdiction”: The US Approach and the Problems 
It Is Facing’ (2015) 40(1) Journal of Space Law 147, 157. 
31 Agreement Among the Government of Canada, Governments of Members States of the European Space 
Agency, the Government of Japan, the Government of the Russian Federation, and the Government of the 
United States of America Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station, opened for 
signature 29 January 1998 (entered into force 27 March 2001) TIAS No 12927 art 5 (‘ISS Agreement’).  





jurisdiction provided by Article VIII.32 The ISS Agreement states that ‘each Partner shall 
retain jurisdiction and control over the elements it registers… and over personnel in or 
on the Space Station who are its nationals’.33 Accordingly, jurisdiction applies both ‘in’ 
and ‘on’ the component parts of the space object, thus granting the State of registration 
wide jurisdiction over the entire physical area of the object, including its outside surfaces 
and the areas within it. Each State retains jurisdiction only over those areas and is thus 
unable to exert enforcement jurisdiction in or on an ‘element’ that another State has 
registered.34 This acknowledged limitation on jurisdiction supports the contention of this 
article as regards the boundaries of jurisdiction over space objects more generally. 
This differentiation of jurisdiction between prescriptive, adjudicative and enforcement 
can only partially address the issue of control and certainty over commercial activity on 
a celestial body. It represents a very indirect mechanism for actually governing activity 
though the mechanism of applicable laws, and an actual capacity to enforce such laws to 
space objects themselves. More importantly however, it does not apply to the actual 
ground activity that may be occurring outside that space object. Hence, it does not stop a 
State asserting enforcement jurisdiction if a relevant national should leave a space object 
that another State has registered. Moreover, it can only apply to a space object that has a 
temporary presence on the celestial body. Hence, space objects such as lunar landers or 
spacecraft that are intended to depart from the celestial body, would be subject to Article 
VIII but they would not be subject to the more comprehensive rights that Article XII of 
the OST provides. This distinction between objects temporarily on the surface of celestial 
bodies and facilities that are established on the same surface is demonstrated by the 
negotiating history of Article XII, which evinces an intent that visitation provisions will 
apply only to facilities permanently stationed on a celestial body. This is clear in the 
treaty’s listing of stations constructed and operating permanently on celestial bodies, as 
against the rejection of the insertion of ‘platforms’ in orbit into the list of visitable items 
 
32 Zhao Yun, ‘Revisiting the 1975 Registration Convention: Time for Revision?’ (2004) 11(1) Australian 
Journal of International Law 106, 117. 
33 ISS Agreement (n 32) art 5. 
34 See discussion of these principles under a previous ISS Agreement in Stacy J Ratner, ‘Establishing the 
Extraterrestrial: Criminal Jurisdiction and the International Space Station’ (1999) 22(2) Boston College 
International and Comparative Law Review 330-332. 






including ‘stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles’.35 Thus, if a space object 
is intended to operate permanently on the surface of a celestial body, then it will be a 
‘facility’ subject to Article XII rights and obligations. There is yet to be any definitive 
agreement or judicial assessment for when a ‘space object’ (Article VIII) can become a 
‘facility’ (Article XII), although indicia regarding the permanence of placement such as 
being fixed in location, would likely be relevant to any such conclusion.   
While Article VIII does provide for the exercise of primary enforcement jurisdiction over 
a space object, albeit even one that is temporarily located on a celestial body, it is unlikely 
to provide for the required level of operational and legal certainty for the ambitious 
commercial off world activities that are currently planned.  
B Article XII 
Article XII of the OST relevantly provides:  
All stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the Moon and other 
celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other States Parties to the 
Treaty on a basis of reciprocity. Such representatives shall give reasonable 
advance notice of a projected visit, in order that appropriate consultations may 
be held and that maximum precautions may be taken to assure safety and to 
avoid interference with normal operations in the facility to be visited.36   
The term ‘facility’ used in the last sentence of this Article at least applies to all ‘stations, 
installations, equipment and space vehicles’ on the Moon and other celestial bodies. This 
Article only applies to facilities on the Moon and other celestial bodies — it does not apply 
to facilities in outer space itself. 
The negotiating history of this Article reveals that an attempt was made by the US to 
replicate a similar provision contained within the Antarctic Treaty.37 Such a provision 
gives liberal rights of ‘visit’ and ‘inspection’ to all State parties to that treaty, to facilities 
 
35 Summary Record of the 64th Meeting, UN GAOR, 4th Comm, 5th sess, 64th mtg UN Doc 
A/AC.105/C.2/SR.64 (24 October 1966) 7 (‘UN COPUOS 64th Meeting’). See, also, UN COPUOS 64th 
Meeting 5, 8, 9. 
36 OST (n 1) art VII. 
37 The Antarctic Treaty, opened for signature 1 December 1959, 402 UNTS 71 (entered into force June 23 
1962); Summary Record of the 63rd Meeting, UN GAOR, 4th Comm, 5th sess, 63rd mtg UN Doc 
A/AC.105/c.2/SR/63 (20 October 1966) (‘UNCOPUOS 63rd Meeting’) at 6. 





established in Antarctica. This very liberal access proposal was rejected, in particular by 
the USSR, during the OST negotiations. This rejection was manifested in the concept of 
reciprocity that was discussed at relative length during the negotiation of Article XII. 
Proposals were discussed regarding the need to have actual facilities on the Moon or a 
celestial body before this right could be exercised.38 Similarly, the issue of whether there 
needed to be parity in the number of facilities, as to whether the right could be exercised, 
was also raised.39 Both of these issues were resolved in favour of expanding the capacity 
to visit other facilities.  
The issue of reciprocity, however, ignited considerable debate during the negotiating 
process as to the exercise of the substantive right in the first place. Not without a level of 
ambiguity, a general consensus emerged that dealt with the question of reciprocity in 
terms of acknowledging an indirect veto States had in restricting access to their facilities. 
Hence it was acknowledged that ‘any State which was affected by the refusal of another 
State to grant access could, on the basis of the principle of reciprocity, suspend its 
obligations to allow access’.40 Critically, the Soviet amendment that introduced the 
concept of reciprocity to Article XII ‘suggested to several delegations that if a particular 
nation, which controls a station on a celestial body, has no desire to inspect the stations 
… of other nations, it is under no obligation to permit visitors from other stations to enter 
its own stations’.41 Such an agreed result means that a refusal to allow a visit would be 
lawful and the consequence of that action would be the lawful denial of a corresponding 
right to visit the facilities of the requesting State party.42 This is not a result of the 
operation of international law and remedies against unlawful conduct,43 but rather an 
exercise of lawful discretion under the wording and meaning of Article XII. 
Where a State party was willing to agree to a visit, then it needed to receive ‘reasonable 
advance notice’ of a projected visit to then undertake ‘appropriate consultations’. Such 
consultations are predicated upon the need to ensure ‘that maximum precautions may be 
taken to assure safety and to avoid interference with normal operations in the facility to 
 
38 UN COPUOS 64th Meeting, (n 35) 5. 
39 Ibid 5. 
40 Ibid 6. 
41 Paul Dembling and Daniel Arons, ‘The Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty’ (1967) 33 Journal of Air Law 
and Commerce 419, 448. 
42 UN COPUOS 64th Meeting (n 35) 6-7 (Canada), 8-9.  
43 Ibid (Italy) 8. 






be visited’. This directly reflects the treaty negotiation consensus that access is not 
absolute and that the right of visit is subject to serious considerations of safety and non-
interference with normal operations.44 This would allow for restricted access and 
controlled conduct within specified areas in a facility to ensure that safety concerns and 
avoidance of interference with normal operations could continue.   
The term ‘visit’ as used in Article XII is not defined in the OST. It is nonetheless notable 
that the term used in the Antarctic Treaty, which was initially in contemplation during 
the negotiations of Article XII,45 allows for an unlimited right of open access to all 
‘stations, installations and equipment’ anywhere within Antarctica and a corresponding 
right of ‘inspection’ of those same facilities at ‘all times’. Similar absolute access rights as 
proposed by the US during the OST negotiations were not accepted. More particularly, 
rights of ‘inspection’ as opposed to reciprocal ‘visit’ are not included within the wording 
of Article XII as a result of the Soviet resistance to the verbatim inclusion of terms as found 
in the Antarctic Treaty. In fact, the Soviet delegate rejected that such an automatic 
comparison could be made between the legal and physical similarities of Antarctica and 
outer space.46 
Article XII represents the only provision in the OST that gives (indirectly) a right of 
control over access to a facility. It does not actually define what a ‘station’ or ‘installation’ 
is, but presumably there is scope to cover the physical limits of such a facility including 
its ground area. The power to deny entry, with the necessary consequence that such 
reciprocal rights are also denied, would give a State (and a company of that State) a right 
to control access to a physical area where such a facility was located. In addition, as 
discussed below, there is a suggestion with the so called ‘Artemis Accords’ that an 
associated safety zone around a facility could also expand beyond the physical limits of 
the facility itself, thus providing a broader range of control.  
The US ‘Artemis Accords’ are a consensus-seeking attempt to develop this concept of 
safety zone and bring it into the accepted canon of lawful activities on celestial bodies 
under international space law. These Accords, presently not fully announced, will attempt 
to gather a number of countries and private actors in a shared recognition of, among other 
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things, the lawfulness of safety zones surrounding celestial installations. NASA cites 
principles found under Article IX of the OST, that States should have ‘due regard’ to the 
interests of other space-faring States, and that they should avoid ‘harmful interference’ 
with the activities of other States, as a legal basis for the establishment of these zones.47 
State practice in adopting the Accords and implementing such zones will help to inform 
the standard and scope of the requirement to show ‘due regard’ under Article IX, as well 
as the threshold for triggering this responsibility. The Accords also seem to invoke 
principles under Article XI of the OST as regards safety zones, suggesting that public 
information about the ‘location and general nature of operations’ will affect their 
establishment and scope.48 Further, they aim to achieve international consensus on the 
extraction of space resources, with NASA citing Articles II, VI and XI of the OST as 
supporting the lawfulness of such activities.49 It is clear that this signals a more laissez 
faire interpretation of the OST’s prohibition on national appropriation, reflecting the 
positions already taken by the US, UAE and Luxembourg.50 However, NASA also suggests 
the Accords will facilitate ‘exploration, science and commercial activities for all of 
humanity to enjoy’, seemingly echoing the sentiments of Article I of the OST.51 Overall, 
the Accords are an encouraging step toward the establishment of accepted, practical 
measures to implement obligations and rights under Article XII of the OST. 
It ought to be noted that the Accords explicitly repudiate principles of the Moon 
Agreement, which will pose challenges for those few States that have ratified that treaty 
(such as Australia). The Accords most notably clash with the Moon Agreement’s 
proscriptions on unilateral extraction and ownership of space resources.52 This is in line 
with the aforementioned US declarations that the Moon Agreement does not reflect 
customary international law.53 Thus, States that accept principles of the Accords would 
 
47 NASA, ‘Principles for a Safe, Peaceful and Prosperous Future’, The Artemis Accords (Web Page, May 
2020) <https://www.nasa.gov/specials/artemis-accords/index.html>. 
48 Ibid. See also OST (n 1) art XI. 
49 NASA (n 47) 6. 
50 See U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (n 8); The UAE Space Law (n 23); Law of July 20th 
(n 24). 
51 NASA (n 47) 6; OST (n 1) art I. 
52 Ibid. See also Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 
opened for signature 18 December 1979, 1363 UNTS 3 (entered into force 11 July 1984) art 11 (‘Moon 
Agreement’). See also commentary by Dennis O’Brien, ‘The Artemis Accords: Repeating the Mistakes of 
the Age of Exploration’, The Space Review (Web Page, 29 June 2020) 
<https://www.thespacereview.com/article/3975/1>. 
53 See Executive Order No 13914 (n 8). 






seemingly signal a rejection of the framework underpinning the Moon Agreement. 
Accordingly, the relatively few parties to the Moon Agreement have a separate regime to 
navigate in adopting the Accords. 
At present, there are no facilities on the Moon or any other celestial body and hence no 
exercise of Article XII rights and obligations. It is likely, however, that when commercial 
activities are commenced on such bodies, that Article XII will quickly acquire great 
significance. It remains the only provision in the OST that recognises a sense of physical 
legal boundaries on a celestial body. As such, the actions of States and private companies 
when invoking the terms of this Article will establish relevant ‘subsequent State 
practice’54 for the purposes of informing meaning of Article XII that will thus provide a 
critical foundation for understanding in decades to come. 
IV MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND THE PROVISION OF SECURITY IN SPACE 
Article IV of the OST provides that ‘The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by 
all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes’ and proceeds to identify 
three specific military prohibitions on the Moon and other celestial bodies: namely, (1) 
the establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, (2) the testing of any 
type of weapons, and (3) the conduct of military manoeuvres. In addition, Article IV also 
specifically prohibits the installation of weapons of mass destruction on the Moon or 
other celestial bodies. Article IV then provides that military personnel undertaking 
scientific research or ‘for any other peaceful purpose shall not be prohibited’. Similarly, 
Article IV makes clear that the use of ‘any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful 
exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited’.   
The term ‘peaceful purposes’ has been accepted to broadly mean ‘non-aggressive’ 
purposes as read consistently with the United Nations (UN) Charter.55 In respect of this 
view, a Canadian Government working paper presented at the Conference on 
Disarmament in 1986, specifically examined this issue of ‘peaceful purposes’.56 The 
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Canadian Government evaluated the views of States on this term, paid regard to the 
negotiating history and subsequent State practice, and looked at analogous treaties. It 
concluded that this term ‘peaceful purposes’ was to be read narrowly and that military 
restrictions needed to be expressly stated in a treaty such as the OST.57 Such a view is also 
reflected by academic commentary. Hobe, for example, notes that: 
The text of the Outer Space Treaty hence remains silent on the precise meaning 
of the notion "peaceful purposes". At the very least, the travaux of the Outer 
Space Treaty do not support a reading that would interpret "peaceful uses" as 
outlawing all military uses of outer space. Though the United States had 
urgently favoured this approach at the beginning of the space era, it soon 
turned to the non-aggressive doctrine. Likewise, the USSR, while publicly 
supporting the "non-military view", used satellites to carry out military 
activities in the guise of scientific research during the Outer Space Treaty 
negotiations.58 
Hobe goes on to observe that ‘[t]he practice of the US and Russia may lead one to conclude 
that the two original space powers do not favour an interpretation of peaceful as “non-
military”’.59 
The wording of the OST is unlike similar terminology used in the 1959 Antarctic Treaty 
that prohibits all military activity in that region, including ‘any measures of a military 
nature’.60 While the wording is subtly different, the significance is considerable. Article IV 
of the OST does not use that same unqualified language as the Antarctic Treaty in its 
prohibition of military activity. As the Canadian working paper on this issue concluded, 
the correct Treaty analogy would be Article 88 of the Law of the Sea Convention, which 
similarly ‘reserves’ the high seas for ‘peaceful purposes’ but outside of restricting acts of 
aggression imposes no further limitation on military activity.61 Hence, it is open to 
conclude that outside of the specific prohibitions enumerated in Article IV (which unlike 
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the Antarctic Treaty are not given as illustrative examples of what is prohibited, but 
rather is an exhaustive list), these provisions do permit the conduct of some military 
activity on the Moon and other celestial bodies. Hence, there is no explicit prohibition of 
military personnel occupying facilities, provided that such facilities are not established 
as a military base, installation and/or fortification. Similarly, while conventional weapon 
testing upon the Moon or other celestial bodies is prohibited, as is the installation of 
weapons of mass destruction, the general presence and carriage of personal weapons is 
not expressly prohibited. Finally, military activities that do not constitute ‘manoeuvres’ 
are not prohibited. This term contemplates the mass movement of troops in formation, 
not the presence of a small security force. However, military activities outside of the 
specific prohibitions contained in Article IV are still subject to the ‘peaceful purposes’ 
obligation and must therefore be consistent with the UN Charter which is directly applied 
to outer space by virtue of Article III of the OST. While efforts to minimise the overt 
militarisation of the Moon and other celestial bodies with the listing of specific 
prohibitions is a desirable goal, it should also not be forgotten that military forces can 
also act to enhance stability and security. This is especially the case with respect to 
controlling private actors engaging in activities in space. The OST creates a unique status 
of private actors in space that implicates deeper issues of international law, in particular 
the regime of State responsibility. Hence, Article VI of the OST provides as follows: 
States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national 
activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, whether 
such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-
governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out 
in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty. The activities 
of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the Moon and other 
celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the 
appropriate State Party to the Treaty. When activities are carried on in outer 
space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, by an international 
organization, responsibility for compliance with this Treaty shall be borne both 
by the international organization and by the States Parties to the Treaty 
participating in such organization.62 
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The wording of Article VI resolved an early potential conflict between the USSR and the 
US. Originally, the view taken by the USSR. was that only States could undertake space 
activities, whereas the US took the view that private companies, as non-governmental 
entities, should also be able to undertake space activities. Article VI represents a 
compromise where private companies are permitted to undertake space activity, 
however, ‘the State concerned’ with a non-governmental entity is to bear international 
responsibility for the activities of that non-governmental entity. As Von Der Dunk notes, 
this means there would be ‘private activity but public responsibility’.63 There has not 
been any great elaboration of what the term ‘national activities’ means within 
international legal discourse.64 Academic commentary (coupled with perspectives 
reflected in national legislation) has largely resulted in a consensus view that 
‘jurisdiction’ over a nation or company satisfies this requirement.65 What is striking about 
Article VI is its very unique application of attribution for the actions of private companies 
in undertaking activities in outer space. Extending way beyond what the normal rules of 
State responsibility require for attribution,66 Article VI imposes a strict requirement of 
attribution upon States. Accordingly, should a private company undertake malevolent or 
unlawful behaviour in space, the relevant State concerned would bear international 
responsibility for that activity. As Von der Dunk poignantly notes, ‘Contrary to the version 
of the concept applicable under general international law … Article VI [makes] no 
difference as to whether the activities at issue were the State’s own … or those of private 
actors’.67 This consequence has very significant implications with respect to 
unpredictable and impulsive actions undertaken by a private company that constitute a 
use of force contrary to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter or even an ‘armed attack’, thus 
allowing a targeted State to respond in self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.68 
Accordingly, this unique attribution regime requires that effective security control be 
exercised over the activities of such a company, especially where there is competition and 
uncertainty as to proprietary rights concerning extraction activity on a celestial body. 
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Paradoxically, therefore, ensuring military security and oversight of a State’s private 
entities on a celestial body enhances the necessary control to avoid escalation and 
potential conflict. This type of military deployment is well accepted in military doctrine 
and also well practiced in the context of international peacekeeping, which has been 
successfully undertaken over the past 70 years within the terrestrial environment,69 and 
can have obvious application in outer space.             
In addition to the issue of attribution and ensuring control, there is ample evidence of 
military to military connections within the terrestrial environment encouraging stability 
and understanding. Military diplomacy itself has an enviable record of averting conflict 
and preserving equilibrium in otherwise tense contexts.70 The OST does permit military 
members to operate on the Moon and other celestial bodies, subject to specifically stated 
prohibitions. Hence, any effort to further ‘read down’ the permissions contained within 
the OST for military forces to provide security, may deliver unanticipated consequences, 
regarding escalatory conduct by private entities and potential conflict.  
V CONCLUSION 
Humanity is at a key moment in its ambitions for space use and settlement. We are poised 
to undertake a truly momentous leap in our history by exploring, using and settling in 
space. We are about to become an inter-planetary species. The capacity for human 
ingenuity has allowed private industry in conjunction with State support to realistically 
plan on the manner in which this can be undertaken. The existing central treaty for space 
— the OST — that was negotiated over 50 years ago, does provide a basic framework of 
principles that will guide this endeavour. However, that treaty was negotiated before 
humanity had even walked on the Moon, and while some of its provisions can be made to 
work, it is not optimal. While it is timely to consider negotiating a new space treaty that 
deals with emerging issues in a comprehensive fashion, the chances of this occurring are 
not good. The last major Space Treaty negotiated was in 1979 with the Moon Agreement 
and to date has a mere 18 ratifications (with no major space faring nations as party). 
Given this record, there seems little likelihood that a new treaty will provide necessary 
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solutions. However, as argued in this article, there are provisions in the existing OST that 
do provide a level of legal foundation for developing a framework that can underpin 
future planned human activity in space.    
Indeed, future space use and human settlement on celestial bodies must be undertaken 
with a sense of confidence in the legal rights and obligations that will accompany planned 
activity. Outer space cannot become a ‘wild west’ free for all, where the strongest prevail 
and armed conflict becomes an optional means for success. The current OST regime, even 
with its current limitations, must be applied creatively to ensure that the interests of all 
are protected and that States remain responsible and accountable for their actions. In this 
context, the proverb that ‘good fences make good neighbours’ rings true. Humanity’s 
development of resources on celestial bodies to expand our ambitions in space needs to 
be undertaken in a context of certainty. One where security is maintained by those who 
are directly responsible under international law to their State and have the capacity to 
control otherwise wayward behaviour. We need to be realistic in ensuring the tendencies 
of human nature which can bring out our worst are properly contained, so as to allow the 
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